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Whenever partial knowledge is considered absolute and turned into ideological and dog-
matic conceptions, the risk increases that the conditions for the people involved might
become dangerous.This will be illustrated by casuistic examples of consequences of one-
sided psychiatric conceptions such as social, biological, and psychological ideas about the
treatment and care of the mentally ill. Present perspectives of an integrative model, i.e., an
advanced bio-psycho-social conception about evidence-based characteristics on the social,
psychological, and molecular-genetic level, require that all of these dimensions should be
considered in order to personalize and thereby improve the care and treatment of the
mentally ill.
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The development of psychiatry has been accompanied by the
debate about various conceptions of mental illness and the pre-
vailing of one or the other of them at different times. Different
consequences on attitudes in treating and caring for mentally ill
patients of always one prevailing conception has been the stronger
the more the conception focused only on a partial aspect of mental
illness. This will be illustrated by casuistic examples
1. for the relationship of conception to practice
2. for the consequences of (at least of one-sided) conceptions on
individual patients
3. Finally in contrast to such absolutization of partial conceptions
(“Verabsolutierung von Partialerkenntnissen” (Jaspers, 1913)
an integrative concept will be suggested.
CONCEPTION AND PRACTICE
The German epigonal placarding of the controversy between Hein-
roth1 (and Ideler2) on the one hand and Jacobi3 as well as Nasse4
on the other hand as one between “psychicists” and “somati-
cists” in the first half of the nineteenth century disregards the
fact that these representatives of different conceptions of men-
tal illness in practice had more in common than was separating
1Heinroth, Johann August Christian (1773–1843), founder of the worldwide first
Chair of Psychiatry at the University of Leipzig (1811).
2Ideler, Karl (1795–1860), head of the “lunatic asylum” at the Charité in Berlin.
3Jacobi, Maximilian (1775–1858), founder of the mental hospital in Siegburg, near
Bonn.
4Nasse, Friedrich (1778–1851), Bonn.
them (Kutzer, 2003). Both reasoned rationally with the concep-
tion of excitability developed by the Scottish physician John Brown
(“Brownianism”) – his thesis of excitability dominated medicine at
that time – and planned their treatment with mechanical coercion
measures as “contrastimulation” (Schott and Tölle, 2006).
My opinion is that the practice of treatment and care of the
mentally ill depends less upon a disease conception but more upon
the experience, attitude, and personality of the psychiatrist – at
least in his individual development.
However, this does not mean that there is no influence from the
commonly accepted conceptions of the time. Thus the psychicist-
versus somaticist-controversy may also indicate how much the
reception of conceptions depends upon the connotations of the
respective epoch. Today both terms are used in an almost oppo-
site meaning: whereas psychicists such as Heinroth – at that time
in the tradition of the Romantic – ascribed mental illness to the
emotions of guilt about a sinful and failed life and reasoned with
this a treatment with mechanical (“somatic”) coercion measures
as a pedagogic therapy that currently is considered inhumane;
but today the psychicists are misunderstood as representatives of
a morally positively seen psychological-psychotherapeutic med-
icine. Conversely, at that time “somaticists” were psychiatrists
who – such as Griesinger5 – ascribed mental illness to brain dis-
eases and thereby were seen as more modern and humane, whereas
5Griesinger, Wilhelm (1817–1868), chair of psychiatry at the Berlin Charité
1865–1868.
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nowadays “biological” psychiatrists are criticized as biological
reductionists. However in the first half of the nineteenth century
the introduction of a somatic conception of mental illness was a
great step forward in the direction of appreciation of the mentally
ill as ill persons [therefore it is no surprise that Griesinger also
supported psychotherapy (Tölle, 2002)]. Today further important
aspects of these conceptions are recognized: the risks of passiv-
ity and dependence of the medical-somatic disease conception,
which protects the ill, and guilt in the disease conception of the
psychicists, which also indicates self-responsibility.
UNCONDITIONALITY OF PARTIAL CONCEPTIONS
Even if psychiatric disease conceptions are attenuated or changed
by medical experience, they can develop considerable effects, par-
ticularly if they do not grasp the complexity of mental illness but
only a partial aspect of it and if this is then accentuated dogmati-
cally. This is the case especially with persons outside of psychiatry
who know the world of the acting medical persons only indi-
rectly or only by hearsay. This will be made clear by three concepts
or clusters of concepts: that of social psychiatry, that of biolog-
ical psychiatry, and that of psychological medicine respectively
psychotherapy.
SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY
In the 1960s social conditions and consequences of mental ill-
ness increasingly came to the fore with young psychiatrists. In the
UK – as the cult movie “Family Life” suggested – the social space
of the family was seen as pathogenic; mental illness was under-
stood as a reaction to a morbid society; or mental illness was
even asserted to be a fiction of psychiatrists, most valuably by the
Hungarian-American psychiatrist Szasz (1961).
In Italy the unbearable conditions of accommodation or cus-
tody of the mentally ill in large psychiatric hospitals, such as in
Görz and Triest in northern Italy, caused the psychiatrist Basaglia
(1968) to “liberate” these mentally ill by “negation,” i.e., to urge the
closure of these large hospitals and, thanks to successful political
exertion of influence, to realize this with the law number 180 in
1978.
This forcible and radical reform in Italy led to the disadvan-
tage of many severely mentally ill persons and their helplessly
overburdened families, who had to take in their otherwise not
cared-for ill family members, and not before, with the devel-
opment of community mental health centers, the basic idea of
extramural-rehabilitative support of the mentally ill gained accep-
tance (Pycha et al., 2011). Still, the older history of social psychiatry
shows that such ideological excess of a right basic idea leads to
instrumentalization of the ill and finally to inhumanity.
The term “social psychiatry” appeared in the beginning of the
twentieth century (Ilberg, 1904) in the context of terms such as
“social pathology” or “social hygiene” as a rational reasoning for
governmental efforts to control the social conditions and con-
sequences of mental illness (e.g., syphilis, alcoholism, “asocial”
psychopathy, vagabondage) by social, particularly even eugenic
measures (Grotjahn, 1912; Rüdin, 1931; Priebe and Finzen, 2002;
Schmiedebach and Priebe, 2003). During the economic misery
after World War I these aims of social psychiatry were radicalized
by the eugenic and thereby biological ideas of “racial hygiene” all
the way to “euthanasia” (Schmiedebach and Priebe, 2003).
This process of convergence, even merging social psychiatry
into “racial hygiene” caused other, much older forms of philan-
thropically or economically motivated forms such as “family care”
or “open care” as social support systems for the mentally ill out-
side the asylums to fade into the background and narrowed them
to modes of social control of the mentally ill. This development
became terribly clear with the “reform” psychiatrists Paul Nitsche
and Valentin Faltlhauser, who stipulated in the 1920s to bring the
mentally ill out from hospital custody and to support them extra-
murally (Nitsche, 1931) but then in the 1930s, in the context of
increasing ideologization in the interest of the collective (the “peo-
ple”) advocated the social control of the mentally ill and finally
murdered them during the war.
After World War I Faltlhauser became a close associate of Gus-
tav Kolb. With his conception of “open care” Kolb initiated an
internationally recognized psychiatric reform. The conception of
“open care” was based upon outpatient care and a social support
network for the chronically mentally ill. As a senior staff member
in the psychiatric hospital of Erlangen Faltlhauser also took over
the position of a care physician (“Fürsorgearzt”). Finally he was
one of the leading reform psychiatrists and in 1929 he became
the director of the Kaufbeuren psychiatric hospital where he also
established “open care.” Together with Kolb and Hans Roemer6 he
published “Die offene Fürsorge in der Psychiatrie und ihren Gren-
zgebieten” (“Open Care in Psychiatry and its Related Areas”) in
1927. Even in 1932, in his textbook of psychiatric care, he recom-
mended the treatment of the chronically ill and rejected euthanasia
measures. However, Faltlhauser pursued from the beginning the
elimination of so-called “psychopaths”:
“. . .One of the most difficult questions of the treatment of
psychopaths in open care is the question of marriage of psy-
chopaths. It is not too much to assert that 80% of psychopaths
marry a psychopath. It is the obligation of social care to pre-
vent such an intended marriage as far as possible . . . (Because
even) tireless information (is useless), perhaps the suggestion
of incapacitation might be successful” (Roemer et al., 1927).
In contrast the current conception of social psychiatry, developed
after World War II, is indeed also extramural but most notably
oriented to the individual by helping the chronically mentally ill
in a graded system of institutional aids to lead a more or less
self-determined life in society7.
My opinion is that partial conceptions of mental illness might
indeed convey transiently less recognized aspects to the public
awareness. However, the more selective they are, the more they let
other aspects be forgotten, and the more they become dogmatic,
6Hans Roemer was a convinced representative of the eugenic prevention of mental
illnesses (including forced sterilization) but – as opposed to Faltlhauser – rejected
euthanasia by a clear memorandum and retired ahead of time 1940 as director of the
psychiatric hospital Illenau when he saw that he was unable to stop the deportation
of his patients (Roelcke, 1993, 2012).
7This indicates also a change of the meaning of terms with the times going, i.e.,
the term of social psychiatry comprises a cluster of fairly different conceptions.
Nevertheless, all conceptions are at risk to become absolutized.
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the more they can become dangerous for the individual ill person
in practice.
This will be illustrated by three examples from the practice:
1. A young assistant in the psychiatric hospital, convinced of social
psychiatry, refused to take over a patient with an acutely deliri-
ous state from surgery because he “was somatically ill.” (At
that time this seemed for me to be a special form of brainless
psychiatry).
2. At the height of the cult movie “Family Life” young colleagues
implicitly addressed reproaches to the parents, mainly those
of patients with schizophrenia, of bearing the blame for the
manifestation of the disease – although this of course ele-
vated contratherapeutically the emotional level of tension in
the family.
3. A student with schizophrenia, decompensated during her uni-
versity examinations, developed a postpsychotic residual state
that was not accepted by her young therapist. The therapist
intensively urged the patient to participate in an active reha-
bilitation program, which the patient tried to avoid. Several
weeks later the patient committed suicide outside the hospital.
Presumably she felt overburdened by the program.
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY
The impressive improvement of the treatment of mentally ill that
was made possible by the development of psychotropic drugs
60 years ago led the practice of drug treatment and research to the
neurochemistry of the brain and the development of new drugs.
For this focus on the brain and thereby on the biological founda-
tions of mental illness the term “biological” psychiatry has become
established.
However currently this term seems to be fading and to be
substituted by the term “neuroscientific” after the possibility of
gaining knowledge by the various neuroimaging measures devel-
oped during the last 30 years broadened research on the neuronal
determinants of psychic functions and diseases so that psychia-
try currently is neuroscientifically oriented. From a psychiatric
viewpoint this research is disease-oriented brain research and its
counterpart in practice is among others a differentiated drug treat-
ment as well as neuropsychologically based methods of behavioral
therapy.
Along with this objectifying, quantifying, disease-oriented view
there is the risk that the patient’s feeling of illness will fade into
the background and be recognized only insufficiently, i.e., that
the patient’s experience of changes of his inner world as well as
of his capacity to acting, his processing of his disease, his aware-
ness of disease-conditioned disturbances of his relationship to his
environment will pass from view. These different perspectives of
disease versus feeling ill of the mentally ill person will be illustrated
by my own experience:
• In the 1950s in a large outpatient clinic for people with epilepsy
I tried to relieve patients from their seizures. My emphasis was
on the disease. Side effects of the necessary drug treatment had
to be accepted by the patient. With increasing experience my
view widened from the disease to the feeling of being ill on the
part of the patient. Today the patient is not only informed about
the side effects of the treatment but, as appropriate, it will be
decided together with the patient for which therapy objective
he is willing to accept which burdens [this development was
recently named “preference diagnosis” (Mulley et al., 2012)].
My opinion: The objectifying narrowing view of the disease leads
to the disadvantage of an empathetic assessment of the patient’s
feeling of being ill. This becomes comprehensible when biomed-
ical research publications almost exclusively speak about research
on patients, whereas it should be termed research with patients,
because the individual subject should be invited to participate in
a research intervention but it should not be researched on him as
an object.
PSYCHOTHERAPY
During the past decades the concept of psychoanalytic psychother-
apy has been joined or even opposed by many other conceptions
of psychotherapy. This has led in practice – due to “the close-
ness of this field of the art of healing to a space free of sanctions”
(Ritschl, 1989) – to the increase of private modifications of con-
ceptions and finally – perhaps according to the contemporary
“postmodern” credo of some philosophers that “everything goes”
(Feyerabend, 1983) – in a few cases resulted in deadly quackery.
Perhaps as a counter-reaction some therapists tried to assert rig-
orously the conception of the method that they performed, i.e.,
to keep it “pure.” Also the standardization of therapy manuals has
been promoted.
My opinion is that not only the training in a specific method
of psychotherapy and the indication for a specific state of mental
disease determine the choice of a certain treatment in an actual
case but also the normative content of the human experience of
the therapist.
This can be seen in the establishment of therapy objectives – not
only in psychodynamic but also in other psychotherapies such as,
e.g., in deconditioning (sometimes even manipulating) techniques
of behavioral therapy. “Is it about adaptation, optimal adaptation
to the social environment, such as if the meaning of human life
is classification or relationship to others? Or is the objective the
maximal evolvement of the patient’s potential such as if the cri-
teria of a healthy existence are only inside the single individual?”
(Ritschl, 1989).
However if psychotherapy – in this case the psychoanalytic kind
as recently published by the philosopher Paul Biegler (2011) – is
declared dogmatically as the ethical imperative in order to support
the autonomy of depressive patients, then danger threatens. This
became apparent when a patient with depression sued his psy-
chotherapist for withholding him antidepressant drugs (Klerman,
1990), or a patient with schizophrenia asked in court for compen-
sation because for years his psychotherapist had refused to treat
him with drugs.
AN INTEGRATIVE CONCEPTION
Against the narrowing of conceptions that depict only partial
aspects of mental illness and whose ideological radicalization dur-
ing the past century had disastrous consequences for the mentally
ill, most psychiatrists today follow a bio-psycho-social concept.
This concept is reasoned in the experience of psychiatrists who
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see in their everyday practice how much the mental state of their
patients is influenced by interaction with their social environment
as well as by earlier impressions in the microsocial space of the
family. These latter ones may be of developmental psychological
or of biological-genetical nature.
In the 1960s the psychiatrist Hans-Joachim Bochnik introduced
a graphical scheme in his Frankfurt University Hospital – the
“Bochnik Triangle” – in which the grade of expression of somatic,
psychic, and social influence on the current state of disease was
to be mirrored (Bochnik et al., 1967). Thus the assistants had
to turn their attention systematically toward all of these deter-
mining dimensions of being mentally ill. The conception became
internationally well-known as the bio-psycho-social model by
the Science-publication of Engel (1977). However, it has been
criticized for being arbitrary and vague with regard to causal expla-
nations of mental and behavioral disorders, and no rule exists for
weighing the relevance of the various conceptions (Ghaemi, 2009).
Therefore, the arbitrariness of the model should be reduced by
focusing on scientifically proven concepts, to be tested for empir-
ical evidence in the individual case, and taken as provisional in a
longitudinal perspective (Brendel, 2003). Nevertheless, it may be
helpful in two directions: at first, it should be used as a didac-
tic tool to direct the psychiatrist toward a systematic exploration
of the patient’s intern and extern context because the knowledge
gained by this procedure may be helpful to guide the patient in
overcoming his being ill; such preliminary trials to assess the
complex texture of the disease at the clinical macro-level can
deepened today at the micro-level: at second, the model encour-
ages the psychiatrist to open his mind for real interdisciplinary
considerations of the causal interchange between social, psychic,
and neurobiological determinants of mental disorders which is
hoped to be developed in the future as some stimulating findings
indicate.
Thus, e.g., the brain researcher Florian Holsboer recently
reported an example for such a gene-environment inter-
action. Holsboer et al could confirm the hypothesis that
defined variations of the gene for the protein FKBP5, which
modulates the function of the corticoid receptor, the most
important receptor of the hormonal stress system, makes the
bearer particularly sensitive for trauma expositions, which
initiate a depression (Zimmermann et al., 2011).
This example, as one of to-date numerous others (Caspi et al.,
2002; Haddad and Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012), substantiates the
hope of recognizing genetic risk profiles for interactions with
specific environmental somatic,psychic, and social factors for indi-
viduals and thereby to approach the objective of individualized
medicine.
However, if this individualization is focused on its somatic base,
i.e., to be content with the question which drug is the right one for
which patient, and if by that loses sight of the psychic and social
context, the chance will be lost to move from individualizing to
personalizing medicine, medicine that recognizes the patient as a
person in all of his relationships and does justice for him.
My final opinion concludes that disease conceptions are effec-
tive as background coordinates for the practicing psychiatrist.
They help him to organize the complex diversity of phenom-
ena: they are instrumental in nature. Even partial conceptions
can help to provide particular awareness for a less considered
but important aspect. However they become dangerous if they
are not understood only as instruments to be used only tran-
siently but are made ideologically absolute under the influence
of dominating ideas in societal context, if they increasingly shut
out important parts of reality, and if they instrumentalize the ill
person – whether for scientific, or for political, or for personal
purposes.
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